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A Secure and Reliable Bootstrap Architecture
Abstract
In a computer system, the integrity of lower layers is treated as axiomatic by higher layers. Under the
presumption that the hardware comprising the machine (the lowest layer) is valid, integrity of a layer can
be guaranteed if and only if: (1) the integrity of the lower layers is checked, and (2) transitions to higher
layers occur only after integrity checks on them are complete. The resulting integrity "chain" inductively
guarantees system integrity. When these conditions are not met, as they typically are not in the
bootstrapping (initialization) of a computer system, no integrity guarantees can be made. Yet, these
guarantees are increasingly important to diverse applications such as Internet commerce, intrusion
detection systems, and "active networks." In this paper, we describe the AEGIS architecture for initializing
a computer system. It validates integrity at each layer transition in the bootstrap process. AEGIS also
includes a recovery process for integrity check failures, and we show how this results in robust systems.
We discuss our prototype implementation for the IBM personal computer (PC) architecture, and show that
the cost of such system protection is surprisingly small.
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Abstract
In a computer system, the integrity of lower layers is
treated as axiomatic by higher layers. Under the presumption that the hardware comprising the machine
(the lowest layer) is valid, integrity of a layer can
be guaranteed if a n d only if: (1) the integrity of the
lower layers is checked, and (2) transitions to higher
layers occur only after integrity checks on them are
complete. The resulting integrity "chain" inductively
guarantees system integrity.
When these conditions are not met, as they typically are not in the bootstrapping (initialization) of
a computer system, no integrity guarantees can be
made. Yet, these guarantees are increasingly important t o diverse applications such as Internet commerce, intrusion detection systems, and "active networks." In this paper, we describe the AEGIS architecture for initializing a computer system. It validates integrity at each layer transition in the bootstrap process. AEGIS also includes a recovery process
for integrity check failures, and we show how this results in robust systems. We discuss our prototype
implementation for the IBM personal computer (PC)
architecture, and show that the cost of such system
protection is surprisingly small.
-

-

1 Introduction

higher levels of abstraction are constructed. Each of
the virtual machines presupposes that it is operating
in an environment where the abstractions of underlying layers can be treated as axiomatic. When these
suppositions are true, the system is said to possess
integrity. Without integrity, no system can be made
secure.
Thus, any system is only as secure as the foundation upon which it is built. For example, a number of
attempts were made in the 1960s and 1970s to produce secure computing systems, using a secure operating system environment as a basis [20]. An essential
presumption of the security arguments for these designs was that system layers underpinning the operating system, whether hardware, firmware, or both,
are trusted. We find it surprising, given the great
attention paid t o operating system security [13] [8]
that so little attention has been paid t o the underpinnings required for secure operation, e.g., a secure
bootstrapping phase for these operating systems.
Without such a secure bootstrap the operating system kernel cannot be trusted since it is invoked by an
untrusted process. Designers of trusted systems often avoid this problem by including the boot components in the trusted computing base (TCB) [6]. That
is, the bootstrap steps are explicitly trusted. We believe that this provides a false sense of security t o the
users of the operating system, and more important,
is unnecessary.

Systems are organized as layers t o limit complexity.
A common layering principle is the use of levels of 1.1 AEGIS
abstraction to mark layer boundaries. A computer
system is organized in a series of levels of abstraction, We have designed AEGIS, a secure bootstrap process.
each of which defines a "virtual machine" upon which AEGIS increases the security of the boot process by
ensuring the integrity of bootstrap code. It does this
'Copyright 0 1 9 9 6 , William A. Arbaugh. Permission is by constructing a chain of integrity checks, beginning
granted to redistribute this document in electronic or paper at power-on and continuing until the final transfer of
form, provided t h a t this copyright notice is retained.
control from the bootstrap components t o the optsubmitted to t h e 1997 IEEE Security and Privacy
erating system itself. The integrity checks compare
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a computed cryptographic hash value with a stored
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digital signature associated with each component.
The AEGIS architecture includes a recovery mechanism for repairing integrity failures which protects
against some classes of denial of service attacks. From
the start, AEGIS has been targeted for commercial
operating systems on commodity hardware, making
it a practical "real-world" system.
In AEGIS, the boot process is guaranteed to end
up in a secure state, even in the event of integrity
failures outside of a minimal section of trusted code.
We define a guaranteed secure boot process in two
parts. The first is that no code is executed unless it
is either explicitly trusted or its integrity is verified
prior to its use. The second is that when an integrity
failure is detected a process can recover a suitable
verified replacement module.

2

Assumptions

The first assumption upon which the AEGIS model
is based is that the motherboard, processor, and a
portion of the system ROM (BIOS) are not compromised, i.e., the adversary is unable or unwilling t o
replace the motherboard or BIOS. We also depend
on the integrity of an expansion card which contains
copies of the essential components of the boot process for recovery purposes, cryptographic certificates,
and optionally a small operating system for recovering components from a trusted network host.
The second assumption is the existence of a cryptographic certificate authority infrastructure in order
to bind an identity with a public key. However, there
is no restriction on its form, e.g., single trusted authority, hierarchical, web of trust [22] [3].
The final assumption is that some trusted source
exists
for recovery purposes. This source may be a
1.2 Responses to integrity failure
host on a network that is reachable through a secure
When a system detects an integrity failure, one of communications protocol, or it may be the trusted
ROM card located on the protected host.
three possible courses of action can be taken.
The first is to continue normally, but issue a warning. Unfortunately, this may result in the execution
3 AEGIS Architecture
or use of either a corrupt or malicious component.
The second is to not use or execute the component.
3.1 Overview
This approach is typically called fail secure, and creates a potential denial of service attack.
To have a practical impact, AEGIS must be able
The final approach is t o recover and correct the to work with commodity hardware with minimal
inconsistency from a trusted source before the use or changes (ideally none) t o the existing architecture.
The IBM P C architecture was selected as our proexecution of the component.
The first two approaches are unacceptable when totype platform because of its large user community
the systems are important network elements such as and the availability of the source code for several opswitches, intrusion detection monitors, or associated erating systems. We also use the FreeBSD operating
with electronic commerce, since they either make the system, but the AEGIS architecture is not limited to
component unavailable for service, or its results un- any specific operating system. Porting to a new operating system only requires a few minor changes t o
trustworthy.
the boot block code so that the kernel can be verified
prior to passing control t o it. Since the verification
code is contained in the BIOS, the changes do not
1.3 Outline of the paper
substantially increase the size of the boot block.
AEGIS modifies the boot process shown in figIn Section 2, we make the assumptions of the AEGIS
design explicit. Section 3 is the core of the paper, ure 2 so that all executable code, except for a very
giving an overview of the AEGIS design, and then small section of trusted code, is verified prior t o explunging into details of the IBM P C boot process and ecution by using a digital signature. This is acits modifications t o support AEGIS. A model and log- complished through the addition of an inexpensive
ical dependencies for integrity chaining are given in PROM board, and modifications to the BIOS. The
Section 4, and a calculation of the complete boot- BIOS and the PROM board contain the verification
strap performance is given; performance is surpris- code, and public key certificates. The PROM board
ingly good. Section 5 discusses related work and crit- also contains code that allows the secure recovery of
ically examines some alternative approaches to those any integrity failures found during the initial boottaken in AEGIS. We discuss the system status and strap. In essence, the trusted software serves as the
our next steps in Section 6, and conclude the paper root of an authentication chain that extends to the
operating system and potentially beyond t o applicawith Section 7.

3' AEGIS ARCHITECTURE

I

OS kernel

I

rn
Operating System

a
Trusted Network
Recovery Host

I
I
, ,

,

,

, ,

,

1

Boot Block

,.

, ,

Expansion ROMs

I ,Level
3
.
Expansion ROMs

I

I

I

-

h

-

d

Level 2

I

I

Trusted Software

System BIOS

(

I

Figure 1: AEGIS boot overview
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tion software [IS] [9] [15]. A high level depiction of the
bootstrap process is shown in figure 1. In the AEGIS
boot process, either the operating system kernel is
started, or a recovery process is entered in order to
repair any integrity failure detected. Once the repair
is completed, the system is restarted to ensure that
the system boots. This entire process occurs without
user intervention.
In addition to ensuring that the system boots in
a secure manner, AEGIS can also be used to maintain the hardware and software configuration of a machine. Since AEGIS maintains a copy of the signature for each expansion card, any additional expansion cards will fail the integrity test. Similarly, a new
operating system cannot be started since the boot
block would change, and the new boot block would
fail the integrity test.

3.2

AEGIS Boot Process

Every computer with the IBM P C architecture follows approximately the same boot process. We have
divided this process into four levels of abstraction (see
figure 2), which correspond to phases of the bootstrap
operation. The first phase is the Power on Self Test
or POST [17]. POST is invoked in one of four ways:

1. Applying power to the computer automatically
invokes POST causing the processor to jump to
the entry point indicated by the processor reset
vector.
2. Hardware reset also causes the processor to jump
to the entry point indicated by the processor reset vector.

Figure 2: IBM PC boot process

3. Warm boot (ctrl-alt-del under DOS) invokes
POST without testing or initializing the upper
64K of system memory.
4. Software programs, if permitted by the operating
system, can jump to the processor reset vector.

In each of the cases above, a sequence of tests are
conducted. All of these tests, except for the initial
processor self test, are under the control of the system
BIOS.
The final step of the POST process calls the BIOS
operating system bootstrap interrupt (Int 19h). The
bootstrap code first finds a bootable disk by searching the disk search order defined in the CMOS. Once
it finds a bootable disk, it loads the primary boot
block into memory and passes control to it. The code
contained in the boot block proceeds to load the operating system, or a secondary boot block depending
on the operating system [lo] [7].
Once the BIOS has performed all of its power on
tests, it begins searching for expansion card ROMs
which are identified in memory by a specific signature. Once a valid ROM signature is found by the
BIOS, control is immediately passed to it. When the
ROM completes its execution, control is returned to
the BIOS.
Ideally, the boot process would proceed in a series
of levels with each level passing control to the next
until the operating system kernel is running. Unfortunately, the IBM architecture uses a "star like"
model which is shown in figure 2.

3. AEGIS ARCHITECTURE
3.2.1

A Multilevel Boot Process

We have divided the boot process into several levels
to simplify and organize the AEGIS BIOS modifications, as shown in figure 3. Each increasing level
adds functionality to the system, providing correspondingly higher levels of abstraction. The lowest
level is Level 0.Level 0 contains the small section of
trusted software, digital signatures, public key certificates, and recovery code. The integrity of this level
is assumed to be valid. We do, however, perform an
initial checksum test in order to identify PROM failures. The first level contains the remainder of the
usual BIOS code. The second level contains all of the
expansion cards and their associated ROMs, if any.
The third level contains the operating system boot
block(s). These are resident on the bootable device
and are responsible for loading the operating system
kernel. The fourth level contains the operating system, and the fifth and final level contains user level
programs and any network hosts.
The transition between levels in a traditional boot
process is accomplished with a jump or a call instruction without any attempt at verifying the integrity of
the next level. AEGIS, on the other hand, uses public
key cryptography and cryptographic hashes to protect the transition from each lower level to the next
higher one, and its recovery process ensures the integrity of the next level in the event of failures.
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Figure 3: AEGIS boot control flow

bootstrap code was previously verified as part of the
BIOS, and thus no further verification is required.
The bootstrap code finds the bootable device and
verifies the boot block.

Assuming that the boot block is verified successfully, control is passed to it (Level 3). If a secondary
boot block is required, then it is verified by the pri3.2.2 AEGIS B I O S Modifications
mary block before passing control to it. Finally, the
AEGIS modifies the boot process shown in figure 2 kernel is verified by the last boot block in the chain
by dividing the BIOS into two logical sections. The before passing control to it (Level 4).
first section contains the bare essentials needed for
Any integrity failures identified in the above prointegrity verification and recovery. Coupled with the
cess
are recovered either through storage on the exAEGIS ROM, it comprises the "trusted software".
pansion
ROM card, or through a network host. If
The second section contains the remainder of the
the
component
that fails its integrity check is a porBIOS.
tion
of
the
BIOS,
then it must be recovered from the
The first section executes and performs the stanROM
card.
The
recovery
process is a simple memdard checksum calculation over its address space in
ory
copy
from
the
address
space
of the ROM card to
order to protect against ROM failures. Following
the
memory
address
of
the
failed
component,
in effect
successful completion of the checksum, the cryptoshadowing
the
failed
component.
graphic hash of the second section is computed and
verified against a stored signature. If the signature
A failure beyond the BIOS causes the system to
is valid, control is passed to the second section, i.e., boot into a recovery kernel contained on the ROM
Level 1.
card. The recovery kernel contacts a "trusted host
The second section proceeds normally with one through a secure protocol, e.g., IPv6 [I],to recover a
change. Prior to executing an expansion ROM, a verified copy of the failed component. The failed comcryptographic hash is computed and verified against ponent is then replaced and the system is restarted.
a stored digital signature for the expansion code. If
the signature is valid, then control is passed to the
The resultant AEGIS boot process is shown in figexpansion ROM. Once the verification of each ex- ure 3. Note that when the boot process enters the
pansion ROM is complete (Level 2), the BIOS passes recovery procedure it becomes isomorphic to a secure
control to the operating system bootstrap code. The network boot.

5' RELATED WORII'

Integrity Chaining and System Performance

4

In AEGIS, system integrity is preserved through the
chain of integrity checks in the boostrap process. The
ideal authentication chain produced by each level verifying the next can be represented by the recurrence

Table 1: BSAFE 3.0 Benchmarks

I. = T r u e ,

The BIOS is typically one megabit (128 Kilobytes),
(1) and the expansion ROMs are usually 16 kilobytes
for o < i 5 4.
+ I = {I L
with some, such as video cards, as large as 64 kilobytes. For analysis purposes, we will assume that
Ii is a boolean value representing the integrity of one 64 kilobyte card and two 16 kilobyte cards are
level i , and is the boolean and operation. I4 is the present. The size of the boot blocks for FreeBSD 2.2
verification function associated with the ith level.
(August 1996 Snapshot) are 512 bytes for the primary
takes as its only argument the level to verify, and it boot block, 6912 bytes for the secondary boot block,
returns a boolean value as a result. The verification and 1,352 kilobytes for the size of the GENERIC kerfunction performs a cryptographic hash of the level, nel. Using the performance of MD5 from table 1, the
and compares the result to the value obtained from a time required to verify each layer using a 1024 bit
stored signature for the level. As stated earlier, the modulus are:
IBM P C does not lend itself to such a boot process.
Instead, we alter the recurrence to:
IQ = True,
for i = 0,3,4,
A K(Li+l)
li A Cy=lI ~ ( L { + , ) for i = 1,

Ii

Ii+l =

I

l ( L + ) )

(2)

for i = 2.

Here, n represents the number of expansion boards
in the system, and our level of assurance is preserved.

4.1

Summing these times gives TA = 0.1665seconds
which is insignificant compared to the length of time
currently needed to bootstrap an IBM PC.

5

Related work

Performance impact on bootstrap The first presentation of a secure boot process was
completion time
done by Yee [21]. In Yee's model, a cryptographic

coprocessor is the first to gain control of the system.
Using the recurrence relation shown in equation 2,
Unfortunately, this is not possible without a complete
we can compute the estimated increase in boot time
architectural revision of most computer systems(TA),without integrity failures, between AEGIS and
even if the coprocessor is tightly coupled. Yee exa standard IBM P C using the following equation:
pands his discussion of a secure boot in his thesis [23],
but he continues to state that the secure coprocessor
should control the boot process verifying each component prior to its use. Yee states that boot ROM
modifications may be required, but since a prototype
secure boot process was never implemented more imwhere t(op) returns the execution time of op. In es- plementations questions are raised than answered by
timating the time of the verification function, K , we his discussion.
Clark [5] presents a secure boot process for DOS
use the BSAFE benchmarks [19] for an Intel 90Mhz
Pentium computer, shown in table 1. The cost of that stores all of the operating system bootstrap code
verification includes time required for computing a on a PCMCIA card. He does not address the veriMD5 message digest, and the time required to verify fication of any firmware (system BIOS or expansion
the digest against a stored signature. Any signatures cards). Clark's model, however, does permit mutual
embedded in the public key certificate are ignored at cryptographic authentication between the user and
the host which is an important capability. However,
the moment.

7 CONCLUSIONS

6

the use of a PCI\IICIA card containing all of the system boot files creates several configuration management problems, e.g., a system upgrade requires the
reprogramming of all the cards in circulation.
Lampson [12] describes a secure boot model as an
example for his authentication calculus. I11 Lampson's model, the entire boot ROM is trusted, and
lie does not address the verification of expansion
cards/ROMs. The Birlix [ll] Security Architecture
proposes a model designed by Michael Gross that is
similar to Lampson's. The Birlix model also suffers
from the same problems. In both cases, the boot
ROM is responsible for generating a public and private key pair for use in host based authentication
once the operating system is running. In AEGIS we
leave any security related functions, beyond the boot
process, to the operating system without loss of security. To do otherwise limits security choices for the
operating system.
None of the approaches address a recovery process
in the event of an integrity failure.

5.1

Discussion
proaches

and

alternative

ap-

A possible criticism of this work is that booting from
a floppy disk provides the same level of protection.
There are several reasons why this is not so. The
first is that providing physical security for the floppy
disk is extremely difficult. Users can take the disks
wherever they like, and do whatever they like to
them. One can envision a user building their own
boot floppy that gives them system level privileges.
The user is now free to read and write anywhere on
the local disk circumventing any security systems put
in place by the "real" boot floppy or the on disk operating system. This problem is described by Microsoft [16] as a method of circumventing the Windows N T file system (NTFS). The major shortcoming, however, in using a boot disk is that none of the
firmware is verified prior to use. Thus, a user can add
or replace expansion boards into the system without
any security controls, potentially introducing unauthorized expansion cards.

6

Status and Future Work

The AEGIS prototype is nearing completion, and
we are confident that a complete description of its
performance and implementation will be provided at
the conference. Difficulty in obtaining BIOS source
code has been a roadblock to modifying it to support
AEGIS as described in the body of the paper. We

have reached an agreement with a BIOS vendor to
provide the source code after some legal details are
finalized.
The current recovery kernel prototype uses IPv6 as
a means of recovering replacement files. FVe intend
to switch to the Internet Engineering Task Force's
(IETF) Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [14] to allow user choice
of a secure protocol. Additionally, the method with
which the recovery kernel contacts a host is currently
via a fixed address. We hope to develop or use a
protocol in which the recovery host's address can be
determined when needed.
The process by which components are vetted,
signed, and the resultant signature and public key
certificate installed needs to be addressed carefully.
We plan to address this once a full prototype is completed, and will report on the results. As a minimum,
we expect to use flaw detection techniques such as
those from Bishop [2], Kannan [4], and others to assist in a technical vetting before the actual signing of
the component.
We are also investigating the use of a cryptographic
sideboard as a high end solution to improve performance and increase security.

7

Conclusions

Current operating systems cannot provide security
assurances since they are started via an untrusted
process. With the explosive growth in Internet commerce, the need for security assurances from computer systems has grown considerably. AEGIS is a
guaranteed secure boot process that ensures that the
computer system is started via a trusted process, and
ensures that the system starts in spite of integrity
failures.
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